Demographic problems are such a multi-faceted and complex issue that almost every demographer has their own view on both the causes and proposed solutions, which usually do not mutually exclude each other. The only consensus exists at the level of consequences: developed countries are experiencing a fertility crisis that most of them cannot fully replenish, often resorting to migration. This leads to serious economic problems, crises in pension systems, and a collapse of healthcare. Whether we look at the United States (average fertility rate for women is 1.7 children), the European Union (1.6), Japan (1.3), China (officially 1.2, although demographers already speak of a rate below 1), or South Korea (0.9) – none of these countries even comes close to the replacement-level fertility, which demographers define as a fertility rate of 2.15. This demographic trend also affects developing countries, although they are at a different level of prosperity, such as Poland and Ukraine.
Among the many reasons given by demographers for this state of affairs, three personally convince me the most: urbanization, education, and secularization. The process of population migration from rural areas to cities means that children, whose accommodation and maintenance in rural areas were relatively cheap and the benefit from their work significant, become a serious financial burden for parents in urban conditions. The widespread access of women to higher education either leads them to resign from motherhood in favor of a professional career or, at best, significantly delays the decision to start a family. Religiosity shows the strongest correlation with fertility, but with social development, secularization tendencies undergo a sudden intensification. Where these factors occur more strongly, for example, in developed and developing countries, the fertility rate clearly decreases. Where these factors occur to a minimal extent, such as in African countries, the fertility rate is the highest in the world. At the same time, these processes are persistent, and they are likely to deepen in the future, both in Poland and Ukraine.
Since the demographic trend for developing countries is known and unequivocally negative, what is the current situation in the countries of interest? Regarding Ukraine, its population was estimated at 52 million people in 1991, while at the end of 2019, it was estimated at 37 million people, although some demographers consider this number to be overstated. Ukraine has experienced four waves of emigration: after the fall of the USSR, after the Orange Revolution, after the war in 2014, with the main destination being Poland; official Polish data mentioned 1.5 million people, although some specialists estimate it to be over 2 million. Then came February 24, 2022, and the fourth wave: a massive exodus of over 8 million Ukrainian citizens, mainly women of working age and children. According to UNICEF, half of the children left Ukraine, although experts estimate a much larger loss. As a result, it is estimated that today 31% of Ukraine’s citizens are retirees. Six months ago, the Ukrainian Institute for Social and Demographic Studies estimated the population in areas controlled by Ukraine to be no less than 25 million people. Additionally, in 2021, natural population growth in Ukraine was negative, with nearly 500,000 people decreasing over the year. In 2022, the number of births decreased by 30%, although Ukrainian authorities did not provide the number of deaths. Estimates suggest around 700,000 people. According to the Institute’s data, up to 70% of refugees may not return to Ukraine, and the longer the war lasts, the less likely their return. According to Valeriy Pekar, a lecturer at the Kyiv-Mohyla Business School, each additional year abroad reduces the probability of an emigrant’s return by several percent. After the war, authorities assume that family reunification and a wave of male emigration from Ukraine will occur. Anticipating this problem, on August 6, 2023, the advisor to the Minister of Internal Affairs of Ukraine, Vadym Denysenko, publicly proposed to ban men from leaving Ukraine after the war, at least for the first three years. Justifying this idea, he emphasized that otherwise Ukraine may not survive as a nation. Recently, on Ukrainian television, Ella Libanova, the director of the Institute of Demography and Social Studies of the National Academy of Sciences of Ukraine, stated, among other things: “We estimate that in 2022, the birth rate was about 0.9 child per woman. We expect its catastrophic decline in 2023.” Therefore, to say that the demographic situation in Ukraine is bad is an understatement.
Of course, the demographic situation in Poland is far from ideal, and it is even more challenging to describe due to the unreliability of official data. Even in 2020, the Central Statistical Office (GUS) claimed that 38 million citizens lived in Poland, while the National Electoral Commission (PKW) reported just over 36 million. GUS mentioned 120,000 immigrants residing in Poland permanently, while the Ministry of National Education (MEN) mentioned 130,000 children alone in Polish schools who had citizenship other than Polish. In such conditions, it is difficult to accurately determine the fertility rate, but due to the lack of other data, we must rely on GUS data. Preliminary data indicate that at the end of June 2023, Poland’s population was 37,698,000, with sixty percent of the population living in cities. The demographic structure clearly indicates the aging of Polish society: over 20% of people are of retirement age, while the percentage of children is currently only 18 percent. In Poland in 2020, fertility was 1.39, in 2021 – 1.33, and the estimate for 2022 indicates a rate of 1.26. Despite the surplus of immigration over emigration, in the first half of 2023, the population of Poland decreased by 68,000 people year on year; in the entire 2022, the population also decreased, totaling 130,000 people. This trend is constant and is due to low natural population growth. Data also unequivocally indicate that a significant number of immigrants leave Poland further west, illustrating how we are wasting the opportunity to create good conditions for them to stay in Poland. Other than GUS data, equally pessimistic data can be found in the report by the Warsaw Enterprise Institute titled “Migrations: Poland’s (so far) Unused Chance,” whose authors estimate that up to 4 million immigrants are currently in Poland, with up to 75% being Ukrainians. At the same time, many foreigners feel that they are working in Poland below their qualifications, which does not contribute to their satisfaction with staying here and does not encourage them to stay in Poland longer. “Without a proper (meaning not rigid) migration policy, Poland will lose the fight for scarce human resources to better-organized Western and Eastern countries in this area,” the report says, and this conclusion must be fully agreed with.
Placing on one side our own demographic problems and on the other – the demographic crisis in Ukraine, it must be stated that the game for improving demography is a classic zero-sum game: where one country gains, the other must lose. To ensure that the emigration of Ukrainians to Poland does not become a source of serious conflict between our countries in the future, we must start discussions on this topic with the Ukrainian side today and develop a framework for long-term cooperation. On our part, we must absolutely ensure the integration of Ukrainian immigrants into our society, emphasizing actions such as simplifying the procedures for legalizing residence, language learning, involvement in local community life, and raising professional competencies. At the same time, we should abandon assimilation tendencies towards them and respect their distinctiveness, but very carefully so as not to create second-class citizens within our country, which would not only be a time bomb but also deeply contradictory to the national character of the Poles. Therefore, an appeal should be made to the authorities, both governmental and local, to adopt systemic solutions aimed at integrating immigrants and not relying solely on the conscience of the Poles in this regard. Who is better suited for this than the descendants of Poles whose generations once lived abroad? Who else will understand the current situation of Ukrainians, extend a helping hand to them, and try to negotiate a compromise on a partnership basis that will soften the ruthless consequences of the ongoing zero-sum game?
